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ABSTRACT 
The FY 2000 Flying Hour Program (FHP) comprised $3.2 billion of the 
Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M, N) appropriation, nearly half of which was 
allocated to the Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) for flight operations and 
aircraft maintenance. Insufficient funding has made it impossible to execute the FHP to 
the Navy Primary Mission Readiness standard of 83 percent. 
This thesis analyzed CNAP FHP cash management for fiscal years 1998, 1999, 
and 2000, including techniques used by managers to execute the under-funded FHP. It 
concluded that CNAP managers use risk contingent cash management strategies and 
techniques to fund requirements while carefully avoiding Anti-deficiency Act violations. 
These techniques include delaying required aviation repairs to future years, reducing at 
home squadron flying hours and using Unfilled Customer Orders. 
Navy budgeting does not recognize valid liabilities for some FHP related 
programs. The FHP is treated as discretionary and used annually as a source to pay these 
recurring liabilities, causing CNAP to be reactive in cash deficit control, always in need 
of fiscal rescue. CNAP transaction costs are increased by constant management of 
funding shortfalls. The risk of failing to meet fleet readiness requirements has grown as a 
consequence. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The defense of the United States depends on credible, reliable armed forces 
operating throughout the globe, protecting American interests. Historically, one of the 
most vital components of the U.S. military has been Naval Aviation. 
All of America's armed forces make valuable contributions to protecting 
U.S. interests, citizens, and friends wherever and whenever they might be 
at risk. But the Navy-Marine Corps team - and naval air power - play a 
unique role. The United States is a maritime nation with vital national 
interests which depend upon the nation's ability to control the seas. In the 
wars and conflicts in which the United States found itself engaged during 
the 20th century, typically more than 95 percent of all material and 
equipment needed for victory went by sea. This will continue to be the 
case, and the United States will continue to require seaborne access 
throughout the world - access that can only be assured by robust naval 
forces. U.S. naval forces also possess extraordinary strategic reach, and 
the daily operations of America's Sailors and Marines have the potential to 
affect the majority of the world's inhabitants. Seventy-five percent of the 
earth's population and a similar proportion of national capitals and major 
economic centers lie in the littorals. This means particularly that Naval 
Aviation's expeditionary operations from the sea provide the United States 
with an enduring and decisive capability to shape and influence events on 
land [Ref. 1]. 
This passage taken from the Navy and Marine Corps document, Naval Aviation. . 
. Forward Air Power. . . From the Sea, highlights the importance of Naval Aviation in 
projection of U.S. power and defense of the country. U.S. Naval Aviation consists of a 
variety of platforms capable of operating from ships at sea and shore bases. Performing a 
wide range of missions from surveillance to land attack, these forces form the nucleus of 
forward presence worldwide. 
The monetary vehicle used to support the daily operations of Naval Aviation and 
its hardware is the Flying Hour Program (FHP), which receives funding from Congress 
via the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) appropriation. The Department of 
Defense's (DoD) budget for FY 2000 was approximately $292 billion, and represented 
over 15 percent of the nation's annual budget. Of this amount, the Navy's O&M, N 
account was $23.3 billion and the FHP represented over $3.2 billion ofthat appropriation 
[Ref. 2]. Forty eight percent of the FHP is allocated to the Commander Naval Air Forces 
Pacific (CNAP), and the majority of the remainder is allocated to the Commander Naval 
Air Forces Atlantic (CNAL). CNAP and CNAL are the two active duty Air Type 
Commanders (TYCOMS). The FHP resources they receive pay for flight operations and 
maintenance costs for aircraft. 
Despite the last four years of increased defense spending, the FHP, like many 
programs in DoD, has faced stringent budgets and limited resources, corresponding to an 
overall decline in dollars and tightening top line controls over the last decade. As a 
result, program managers have faced difficult decisions in budget execution, attempting 
to satisfy operational requirements with scarce dollars. 
B.        PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the cash management of the Flying Hour 
Program at Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000. 
Previous thesis work has explored the variable factors and decisions that occur during 
budget formulation that explain under-funding of the FHP [Ref. 3]. This study will 
examine techniques used by managers to execute the FHP budget at CNAP to overcome 
documented under-funding.  Fiscal decisions and budget execution by CNAP managers 
will be discussed and their effects on operational fleet readiness explored. 
The following research questions are addressed in the body of the thesis: 
1. Primary Research Question 
What methods and procedures have been used to execute CNAP's annual FHP 
budget to overcome under-funding? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• In what ways have fiscal decisions and budget execution techniques used 
by CNAP managers affected operational units? 
• How do contingencies affect budget execution? 
• What effect has reprogramming had on FHP execution? 
• What implication for the Department of the Navy does CNAP FHP 
budgeting methodology present? 
C.       SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The primary source of information used in developing this thesis was through 
personal interviews with various past and present staff members at the Headquarters of 
Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet in San Diego, California. These included 
managers from the offices of the Comptroller and Aviation Flight Hour Operations. 
Additional information was collected through telephone interviews and email with staff 
at various branches in the office of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and Assistant Chief of 
Naval Operations for Air Warfare. 
The remainder of data was collected through the review of numerous publications 
on all aspects of the Navy Flying Hour Program and Budget Execution including: Flying 
Hour Cost Reports, Operation Plan 20s (primary FHP budget exhibits), POM issue 
papers, Center for Naval Analyses studies, Navy and other government reports, Navy 
instructions, Naval Postgraduate School theses, and other related research papers and 
articles. 
D.        ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. 
Chapter I provides an introduction, where the background, purpose, scope and 
methodology are explained. 
Chapter II provides a framework for this thesis and explains some of the 
challenges of budget execution. The use of ex ante and ex post controls on budget 
execution is explained. 
Chapter III contains an overview of the FHP budget at -CNAP and is derived 
almost exclusively from a previous Naval Postgraduate School thesis conducted by 
Keating and Paulk. [Ref. 3]. Funding sources, terms, components of FHP, organizations, 
and controls on the budget are described. 
Chapter IV is an analysis of FHP budget execution at CNAP for fiscal years 1998, 
1999, and 2000. Overall budget execution trends will be discussed. 
Chapter V summarizes the data presented and provides possible solutions to 
problems identified. 
II.      CHALLENGES OF BUDGET EXECUTION 
A.       BUDGET EXECUTION 
In its instructions to federal agencies on budget execution contained in OMB 
Circular A-34, the Office of Management and Budget describes the budget execution 
process as follows: 
The budget execution process encompasses the apportionment of funds, 
the obligation of those funds over the course of a fiscal year, and the 
actual outlay of funds. Prior to the fiscal year, or within 30 days after a 
spending bill is approved, you must submit an apportionment request to 
OMB for each account. At the beginning of the fiscal year, or at such 
other times as necessary, OMB apportions funds - that is OMB specifies 
the amount of funds that you may use by time period, program, project or 
activity - from the funds appropriated to you for that fiscal year. 
Throughout the year, you.carry out various programs, projects, and 
activities. These actions use up the available funds by obligating the 
Federal government to make outlays, immediate or in the future [Ref. 4:p. 
xii]. 
Thus, the point of impact of governmental budgeting is budget execution. "While 
the act of budgeting is a planning process, budget execution is a management process" 
[Ref. 5:p. 233]. Much has been written and conjectured about budget development, but 
little attention is paid to budget execution. Pitsvada notes the fundamental importance of 
budget execution and calls for more attention to it. "It is, after all, the entire reason that 
agencies prepare and justify budgets and Congress enacts them" [Ref. 6: p. 100]. 
The reason for the lack of research in budget execution is that it is removed from 
the high profile of public policy and budget development debates. The budget manager 
plods along day after day responding to contingencies and other events, attempting to 
execute his program in the most efficient and responsible manner. 
However the ordinary routines of budget execution are usually carried out 
far from the spotlight of public attention and the day to day crises that 
make up much of the daily lives of account administrators and program 
managers are slowly buried under an accumulating mass of detail as the 
fiscal year rolls on [Ref. 5:p. 234]. 
Another reason for the lack of research in budget execution is the diversity and 
complexity of budgets themselves. 
Budget execution remains the most neglected area of budget research and 
this paucity of research has existed for many decades, probably because 
budget execution is such a diverse complicated field that is filled with 
complex details [Ref. 6:p.84,100]. 
B.       DOD OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE (O&M) ACCOUNT 
The daily operating routine of DOD is financed through the O&M appropriation. 
This account is an extremely important one that provides the material and training to 
safely and efficiently operate ships, aircraft, tanks and guns. The current operational 
readiness of the U.S. military is dependent on the viability of the O&M account. This 
account is often the target for budget cuts in order to fund other programs. 
The DOD Operations and Maintenance account is analogous to the 
supporting expense category in most other budgets; it funds everything 
from bombs to bullets, steaming hours to flying hours, yellow tablets to 
yellow paint. It does not fund military personnel, weapons systems 
procurement or research and development. This account is closely 
watched, for it is a major contributor to training and readiness and to the 
ability of DOD to go places and do things. It is also closely watched when 
new missions emerge or budget reductions are necessary. To assume a 
new, unbudgeted, mission in the national interest within a fiscal year often 
means finding money in the O&M accounts and spending it, with the 
reimbursement coming later. When quick budget reductions are needed, 
the O&M account is often the first target, because it is usually spent out in 
one year and a dollar reduction means a dollar saving in the particular 
year, whereas the ship procurement account may require $20 of reductions 
to get one dollar of reduction in the current year because ship construction 
is a multiple year account. In sum, the O&M account, which averages 
over 35 percent of the DOD appropriation, is a sensitive and important 
account which funds much of the daily business of DOD [Ref. 5:p. 239]. 
Additionally, McCaffery and Mutty point out, "The O&M account is not a neat 
and orderly world. Prices and inflation rates change; commodity prices fluctuate; 
operating tempos change from what was anticipated and fund managers must adjust to 
these changes" [Ref. 5:p. 244]. In fact, what DOD managers experience in budget 
execution can be and often is far displaced from what budget planners anticipated during 
budget formulation. The disconnect between budget formulation and budget execution 
makes it difficult for managers to effectively carry out the intended goals of their 
programs. 
The very nature of what the O&M account provides—combat ready forces 
responding on demand-makes O&M budget managers' jobs challenging.   Increased 
levels of operations caused by national crises or responses to other countries' actions 
cause additional spending that is difficult to forecast.  Other challenges face the budget 
manager  in properly performing  his  management role  of matching  resources  to 
requirements. In budget execution several different aspects of the process tend to impede 
or hinder the manager from smoothly implementing his program and achieving its goals. 
The next section discusses some of the problems in the execution process. 
C.        INHERENT PROBLEMS IN BUDGET EXECUTION 
1.        Taxes (Administrative) 
Superior headquarters in the chain of command impose administrative taxes, also 
known by fleet units as "withholds," in order to have some reserve available should the 
need arise. Withholds may also be used to fund a special project or program that has not 
been sufficiently funded to satisfy an individual senior commander.    The program 
manager must determine how to overcome the associated reduction of funds.    The 
program may have originally been properly funded, but subsequent to taxation, the 
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manager is forced to prioritize requirements in dealing with the loss of funding. Even if 
the resources are restored at a later date, the manager must still make it through the 
current period without the money until it is returned. The tax is imposed after the budget 
was developed, and thus, the manager must administer the program with less money than 
is required. 
2. Timeliness 
When Congress does not pass authorization and appropriation bills by the start of 
the fiscal year, spending is initially restricted to the previous year's level. If more money 
is needed than last year, a backlog of requirements is created that cannot be resourced 
until later in the execution cycle. More dollars must be spent to effect short-term fixes 
just to survive until needed money does arrive. In a similar manner, managers may be 
required to execute part of the budget when the funding for that portion of the budget 
may be not come until later in the fiscal year. The manager must become creative in 
figuring ways to execute what is expected, in order to meet current requirements. 
"Whenever funding is not received when it is anticipated, budget execution is affected" 
[Ref. 5:p. 248]. 
3. Spending Rates and Management Information Systems 
It is often difficult for a fund manager to know exactly how much has been spent 
because of the enormity of the budget and the numerous entities that spend parts of the 
budget.   This is especially difficult for managers who have large numbers of reporting 
organizations spending funds, each with varying demands. Although plans are usually in 
place for the allocation of specific amounts to different units, unforeseen adjustments to 
spending rates routinely occur.   Some reporting units may under-execute their budget 
while others over-execute.   The manager must distribute and monitor his account to 
8 
ensure that money is available to each of his reporting units despite the ebb and flow in 
various units' operations. Operational units working around the clock in distant locations 
exacerbate the difficulty in pinpointing amounts spent. 
Despite efforts to closely track expenditures, information systems are only as 
good as the transmitted data. It becomes a guessing game for the manager to know 
whether a particular organization will fully execute its program by the end of each 
reporting period. What the overall manager sees is that expenditure rates on his 
information reporting system usually lag actual expenditures. When this occurs across 
hundreds of commands, the ability to know how much has been spent is greatly hindered. 
4. Color of Money 
The Operations and Maintenance appropriation has a one year life cycle and 
finances the cost of ongoing operations. "The restrictions on appropriations effectively 
create legal boundaries that put the budget manager in a budgetary box with walls that are 
difficult to breach. The ability of a fund manager to move money from one box to 
another is normally beyond the control of the funds administrator" [Ref. 5:p. 249]. Once 
money is depleted from one box, no additional expenditures of that color of money can 
occur. Different fund codes exist to ensure that the intent of Congress is being fulfilled. 
5. Flexibility 
"Flexibility in the budget execution process means the ability to make 
adjustments within the resources that have been allocated. As with discretionary dollars, 
the higher the level of management, the greater the degree of flexibility"[Ref. 5:p. 251]. 
Reprogramming allows funds to be shifted from one purpose to another within the same 
appropriation giving managers added flexibility.   In general, program managers have 
limited amounts of flexibility that they are allowed to exercise in the performance of their 
duties.  Managers must deal with the conflicting ideals of budget flexibility and budget 
control. 
D.       BUDGET CONTROLS 
A control is a measure to provide reasonable assurance that programs will achieve 
their intended results. A rudimentary example of a control is a master's leash on a dog. 
Ideally, neither master nor dog is struggling against the other and neither even realizes 
that the leash is in place. Although this illustration is simple, the subject of administrative 
controls becomes complex and is of much importance. "Administrative (budget) controls 
refer to the normal events of budget execution as they are experienced in the daily lives 
of most administrators and have to do with executing and adjusting the budget plan that 
was developed and refined in the executive branch and reviewed and approved in the 
legislative branch" [Ref. 5:p. 238] 
As explained by Jones and Thompson, the crafting and use of control systems 
requires careful consideration. 
The design and implementation of control systems is a ubiquitous 
problem. It is encountered by engineers, planners, and regulators as well 
as management controllers. The purposes of various kinds of control 
systems differ, as do the details of their execution, but all control systems 
designers face the same key choices: what, where, when, and, in the case 
of human systems, whom to control. The choice of what and where to 
control is reasonably self-evident. Management control should be 
primarily addressed to the behavior of service suppliers (that is, the 
military departments and defense agencies, other departments of 
government such as the General Services Administration, and contractors), 
the efficiency with which they produce goods and services, and ultimately 
the efficiency with which they use the assets at their disposal [Ref. 7:p 
156]. 
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Too much control and controls of the wrong kind impede program efficiency. 
With the size of the federal budget, small percentage errors by budget managers equate to 
large dollar errors. Therefore, controls that ensure fiscal propriety contain powerful 
practical value. However, proper controls should not hinder the manager's ability to 
effectively execute the budget. Controls do not come without a price. "Controls 
contribute nothing of positive value; their singular purpose lies in helping us avoid waste. 
To the extent that they do what they are supposed to do, they can generate substantial 
savings. But it must be recognized that controls are themselves very costly" [Ref. 7:p. 
182]. 
One of the best-known controls in U.S. government budget execution is Title 31 
Section 1517, better known as the Anti-deficiency Act (ADA). 
The Anti-deficiency Act consists of provisions of law that were passed by 
Congress (beginning in the nineteenth century and later incorporated into 
Title 31 of the United States Code) to prevent departments and agencies 
from spending their entire appropriations during the first few months of 
the year. .. .Under the Act, if you'obligate or expend more than the amount 
in the appropriation or fund or the amount apportioned or any other 
subdivision of funds, you shall be subject to appropriate administrative 
discipline, including - when circumstances warrant - a written reprimand, 
suspension from duty without pay, or removal from office. In addition, if 
you are convicted of willfully and knowingly over-obligating or over- 
spending the amount, then you shall be fined not more than $5,000, 
imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both [Ref. 4:p. 132]. 
The consequences and stigma associated with potential ADA violations loom 
large for defense budget managers as they execute their budgets. They are constantly 
aware of its repercussions and diligently strive to avoid violations. 
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1.        EX ANTE CONTROLS 
Budget control can be imposed before-the-fact, (ex ante) controls, or after-the- 
fact, (ex post) controls. "Before-the-fact controls are intended to prevent subjects from 
doing undesirable things or to compel them to do desirable things and necessarily take the 
form of authoritative mandates, rules, or regulations that specify what the subject must 
do, may do, or must not do" [Ref. 8:p. 552]. "The logic of ex ante control is that 
constraining managerial discretion is the first purpose of budget execution . . . Some 
examples of ex ante controls include object-of-expenditure appropriations, 
apportionments, targets, position controls, and fund and account controls that regulate 
spending by account and the kind of assets that can be acquired by governmental 
departments and agencies" [Ref. 9:p. 578]. The constraining nature of before-the-fact 
controls leads Thompson to recommend "that controllers should resort to before-the-fact 
control designs only where the cost and production behavior of the good or service in 
question makes their use the least objectionable alternative available" [Ref. 8:p. 555]. 
2.        EX POST CONTROLS 
"The logic of ex post control is that the purpose of the budget is to establish 
performance targets that are high enough to elicit from the organization's managers their 
best efforts" [Ref. 7:p. 578]. After-the-fact controls are designed to motivate subjects to 
make good decisions. "Examples are those controls imposed as a result of audit findings, 
program evaluation, or policy analysis" [Ref. 9:p. 577]. Johansen, Jones and Thompson 
further explain ex post controls on budgets. 
Under this approach to budget control, the structure of authority and 
responsibility within the organization is of interest to the financial 
controller. The effectiveness of this design depends on the elaboration of 
well-defined objectives, accurate and timely reporting of performance in 
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terms of objectives, and careful matching of spending authority and 
responsibility. Its effectiveness also depends upon the clarity with which 
individual reward schedules are communicated to responsibility center 
managers and the degree of competition between alternative management 
teams. Finally, under this approach, the financial liability of government 
depends on the costs incurred in providing the service and not merely on 
the quantity or quality of the service provided [Ref. 9:p. 578]. 
The use and structure then of ex post controls clearly require detailed thought and 
analysis of the program budget to be controlled. 
E.        MATCHING CONTROLS TO PROGRAMS 
"Budget execution control system design should fit the objectives of control and 
the nature of the entity to be controlled" [Ref. 9:p. 576]. Jones and Thompson explain 
that controls on budget execution ought to be tailored to the type of good produced. 
Most management control theorists believe that where consequences (that 
is, an organization or responsibility center's outputs) are easily monitored, 
control should focus on the consequences of the subject's decisions; where 
they are not. control should focus on their content (inputs). Because 
consequences arc easily monitored where entities produce homogeneous 
outputs or where a responsibility center within an entity performs fungible 
activities, it follows that controllers should rely on after-the-fact controls 
where homogenous outputs are supplied. In contrast, it follows that they 
should rely on before-the-fact controls where each item supplied is, from 
the "customer*s" perspective, intrinsically unique. Furthermore, this view 
has been reinforced by recent findings in transaction-cost economics and 
agency theory  [Rcf 7:p. 163]. 
When budget controls are not properly matched to budget purpose, inefficiencies 
are rampant. For example, if budget control excessively limits prudent amounts to be 
expended on valid requirements in legitimate periods, the budget manager may be 
required in execution to start and stop budget expenditures contingent on amounts of 
money available at any one time. Additionally he may be forced to likewise place 
restrictions and limits on subordinate executers in accomplishing routine operations. 
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Based on the findings of Jones and Thompson, there is "not a perfect match 
between the control strategies used by the Department of Defense and the cost behavior 
of the goods and services it produces and acquires" [Ref. 7:p. 191]. The tendency in 
many organizations is a reliance on before-the-fact controls, restricting efficiency and 
increasing costs in budget execution. 
The next chapter contains an overview of the Flying Hour Program (FHP) at 
Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific. Funding sources, terms, components of the FHP, 
and associated organizations are described. 
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III.    THE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM (FHP) AT CNAP 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Flying Hour Program (FHP) is the vehicle by which the Department of the 
Navy (DoN) budgets and allocates annual funding for the operation and maintenance of 
all Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. Fleet Commanders and Resource Sponsors use the 
FHP to construct defensible budget exhibits that justify the resources required to attain 
aviation mission readiness goals for combat, support, and training aircraft. Attainment of 
aviation readiness goals contributes to the successful execution of the National Military 
Strategy [Ref. 3:p. 11]. 
B. FHP FUNDING COMPOSITION 
FHP funding composition comes from the O&M, N appropriation account which 
is divided into budget activities. Figure 3.1 shows the full FHP funding composition. 
The FHP is a part of the "Operating Forces" (BA1) budget activity. Operating Forces are 
subdivided by Activity Groups (AGs) and Sub-activity Groups (SAGs). AGs and SAGs 
are codes, which reflect the activity and functional areas responsible for administering the 
FHP. Flying Hour Program AGs are "Air Operations" (1A00), and "Combat and 
Operations/Support" (1C00). Over 90 percent of the FHP resources fall under the Air 
Operations AG. 
FHP funding is divided into two major areas corresponding to the SAGs. These 
are Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO) and Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM). The 
squadrons receive AFO funding, known as Operational Target Functional Category 
(OFC-01) or "01 OPTAR". The 01 OPTAR (AFO) is comprised of two fund codes, 7B 
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(fuel) and 7F (flight equipment). Air stations, which support the squadrons, receive 
AOM funding, known as OFC-50, referred to as an "Operating Budget". An air station's 
OFC-50 (AOM) account consists of Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) - fund code 7L 
(consumables), and Aviation Depot Level Repairables (AVDLRs) - fund code 9S 
(repairables). Aircraft carriers (CVs) and other air platform ships (LPH and LHA) 
receive AOM (OFC-50) funding when the air wing and squadrons are embarked [Ref. 
3:p. 24]. 
C.       FHP CHAIN OF COMMAND 
The dynamic environment of the FHP requires the participation of multiple Navy, 
Marine Corps, and DoD organizations. Two main functional chains of command exist to 
oversee the operation and financing of the FHP. The operational chain, (depicted in 
Figure 3.2 for the Pacific Fleet), gives direction for the daily mission tasking for all Navy 
and Marine Corps aircraft. This chain illustrates the flow of authority from the President 
to the squadron commander. Organizations within the operational chain provide input for 
consideration in budget formulation, but have a minimal role in formal budget 
development. The financial chain, depicted in Figure 3.3, illustrates the flow of the FHP 
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D.       FHP BUDGET PHASES 
1.        Budget Formulation 
During budget formulation resources required for operating and maintaining the 
fleet's aircraft are requested.   The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for Air 
Warfare (N-78) assembles budget exhibits designed to justify specific levels of funding 
required for each aircraft type. The primary FHP budget exhibit is the Operational Plan 
20, (OP-20).   The N-78 staff constructs the necessary FHP budget exhibits and works 
closely throughout the year with the Major Claimants such as Commander in Chief 
Pacific  Fleet  (CINCPACFLT)   and  Air  Type   Commanders   (TYCOMs)   such   as 
Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) in receiving the necessary budget inputs 
required for assembling and justifying the annual budget funding requirements.   Figure 
3.3 displays these budget inputs in relation to the financial organization. The three input 
mechanisms used at the squadron, air station, and N-78F levels are the Budget OPTAR 
Report (BOR), the Flight Hour Cost Report (FHCR), and the Operation Plan 20 FHP 
budget exhibit [Ref. 3:p. 29]. 
The BOR and the FHCR are the primary financial management inputs used at 
CNAP to administer and track FHP obligations during the fiscal year. These reports 
collectively form the data used by N-78F to build new OP-20 budget exhibits. The BOR 
categorizes obligations by aircraft type and includes the following [Ref. 10:p. 12.3.7]: 
Obligation totals by fund code for OFC-01 and OFC-50 for that month 
Total gallons and type of fuel (e.g., JP-4/5) consumed for the month and 
fiscal year to date (F YTD) 
Flight hours flown for the month and F YTD 
Number of aircraft assigned by Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) and Type 
Equipment Code (TEC) 
Remaining OPTAR grant balance for the squadron 
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During budget execution, FHP costs are reported in the Flying Hour Cost Reports 
(FHCR) by the Air TYCOMs. Source data for FHCRs are the Budget OPTAR Reports 
(BORs), transmitted from squadrons and air stations that fall under the cognizance of the 
Air TYCOM. FHCRs are transmitted electronically from the TYCOMs to N-78F and 
FMB on a monthly basis. FHCR data are entered into the Flying Hour Projection System 
(FHPS) and serve as the primary budget input to develop OP-20 budget exhibits [Ref. 
11 :p. 10-7]. The report depicts the cost per hour and total obligations to date for each of 
the three direct cost components (fuel, maintenance and AVDLR), by program element, 
and type/model/series (T/M/S) of aircraft. 
The OP-20 is the main budget execution document produced from the N-78F 
Flying Hour Projection System (FHPS) that relates annual budgeted flying hours to 
forecasted flying hour costs. The OP-20 is broken down by FHP schedule, program 
element, and T/M/S which reflect the flying hours and budgeted cost per hour (CPH) for 
each of the cost components. During budget formulation, the OP-20 serves as guidance 
for the Major Claimants and TYCOMs annual authorized flying hours that may be flown 
by each T/M/S aircraft, and the top-line funding allocation for the execution year. The 
Major Claimants and Air TYCOMs use the OP-20 as a guide in preparing their respective 
budgets and check if the funding and hours provided meet their requirements. Once 
approved via the budget process, the OP-20 becomes the primary resource allocation 
document for the TYCOMs to execute their respective Flying Hour Programs [Ref. 
3:p.61]. 
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2.        Resource Allocation and Execution 
Resource allocation includes the decisions on and analysis of the distribution of 
funds from Congress down the chain of command to squadron commanders. Execution 
is the spending of congressionally provided funds. Following Congressional budget 
approval and Presidential signature, the Treasury Department issues an Appropriation 
Warrant to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OMB then apportions funds 
via the DoD Comptroller to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Financial 
Management and Comptroller (ASN (FM&C)), specifically the Office of Budget (FMB), 
who allocates funds to the major claimants. FHP funding is released quarterly from FMB 
to CINCPACFLT, and on to CNAP, and finally to the air stations and squadron 
commanders [Ref. 3:p. 31]. 
E.        THE FHP BUDGETING PLAYERS 
This section explains the budgeting and execution actions performed by the 
organizations in the FHP financial chain of command, beginning at the aviation 
squadrons, through the CINCPACFLT level. Understanding of how FHP funds are 
allocated and executed at the user levels provides a better understanding of all FHP 
budget actions. 
1. Squadron Level and Air Station/CV 
a.        Funding Allocation - Squadron 
Navy Operations and Maintenance, (O&M, N) funding for the FHP is 
made available annually but is provided to the fleet quarterly.  Beginning with the new 
fiscal year on October 1st, each Navy and Marine squadron and their supporting air 
station or ship, if deployed, receives one quarter's worth of flight operation funding from 
CNAP.    These quarterly funds are called Operational Target Functional Categories 
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(OFCs) or commonly known as Operating Targets (OPTARS). An OPTAR represents 
the anticipated funding level necessary to support the costs of a squadron's flight 
operations. Receipt of the OPTAR gives the squadron authorization to place obligations 
against CNAP's FHP funds up to the amount of the issued OPTAR grant [Ref. 3:p. 32]. 
The squadron OPTAR is comprised of two cost expense accounts, Aircraft Flight 
Operations (AFO or OFC-01) and Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM or OFC-50). 
The OFC-01 and OFC-50 accounts are designed to indicate how FHP funds are spent and 
record the type of materials purchased. 
• (OFC-01) Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO). OFC-01 funding provides 
for petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) used during flight operations and 
any required flight equipment used in the operation of the aircraft. These 
funds are accounted for under the 7B (fuel) and 7F (Administrative and 
flight equipment) fund codes. 
• (OFC-50) Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM). The AOM account is 
broken down into Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) and 
Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM). 
• Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR). AVDLRs are repairable 
aircraft components or assemblies. These components are generally high 
cost and require long procurement lead times. Due to their high cost, 
significant savings can be achieved by repairing them as opposed to 
discarding these items when they fail or break [Ref. 12]. AVDLRs are 
typically repaired at the Depot Level when the item is determined to be 
Beyond the Capability of Maintenance (BCM) of the Intermediate 
Maintenance Activity (IMA). AVDLRs represent the largest portion of 
funding within the FHP budget. AVDLRs are financed under the Navy 
Working Capital Fund (NWCF) system. Under this system, squadron 
OFC-50 accounts finance the depot level repair and procurement of these 
repairable components. Charges are incurred if components are ordered 
during AVDLR repair at the IMA and if the AVDLR must be sent "off- 
station" for depot level repair. Thus, the supporting IMA and air station 
retain control of AVDLR funds and associated accounting responsibilities 
[Ref. 10:p. 12.3.7]. 
• AFM. The AFM portion of the squadron's OFC-50 (AOM) account is 
typically spent on "consumables" - inexpensive parts used in support of 
flight operations such as paint, wiping rags, towel service, cleaning agents, 
compounds used in the corrosion control of aircraft, and consumable 
23 
repair parts [Ref. 10:p. 12.3.7].When combined with the consumable 
maintenance costs incurred at Intermediate maintenance levels (I-Level), 
these costs comprise the Maintenance (MNT) category. 
"Special Interest Category" Funding Other (FO). Although not 
specifically a squadron expense, FO category is included here to indicate 
the overall relative costs of the FHP as shown in Figure 3.4. FO costs are 
not included in the OP-20. These "other" costs represents outlays for 
flight simulator operations, civilian labor, administrative supplies, 
material, equipment, maintenance service contracts, and expense for travel 
and lodging associated with pilot and crew Temporary Additional Duty 
(TAD). Most of these costs are considered an integral part of the cost for 
Naval Aviation, but there are no FHP resources programmed by N-78F for 
FO. However, FO costs are incorporated in the major claimants' regular 
budget submission. The Air TYCOMs provide input for the development 
of this budget, based on their forecasted requirements for the FO category 










Figure 3.4.      FHP Cost Components [Ref. 13]. 
b. Funding Allocation -Air Station/CV 
Supporting air stations also receive a quarterly FHP operating budget from 
CNAP at the beginning of the each fiscal year. This operating budget is called a "dash 1" 
(in reference to the document it is received on - NAVCOMPT FORM 2168-1). The 
"dash 1" provides funding needed to support the repair of AVDLRs for all tenant 
squadrons. CVs also receive AOM funding when the air wing and squadrons are 
embarked onboard.   However, the ships receive an OPTAR vice an Operating Budget. 
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This distinction is made because financial management regulations differ between shore- 
based activities and afloat units [Ref. 3:pp. 34-35]. 
c. Funding Execution - Squadron 
Throughout the fiscal year squadron commanders keep track of all FHP 
expenses and carefully monitor their OPT AR account to ensure they do not exceed their 
quarterly FHP OPTAR. The accounting procedures used to obligate FHP funds at the 
squadron are performed using the Aviation Storekeeper Information Tracking System 
(ASKIT). ASKIT is a computer program that records and tracks all OPTAR obligations 
by 7B and 7F fund codes [Ref. 3:p. 35]. 
If the squadron is unable to obligate all of its OPTAR funds before the end 
of the fiscal year, these funds are returned to CNAP for reallocation. Squadrons are able 
to obligate their OFC-01 (fuel) funds by increasing their flight operations, and deplete 
any remaining OFC-50 (AOM) funds by purchasing needed materials and supplies [Ref. 
3:p. 36]. 
d. Funding Execution - Air Station/CV 
Air stations CYs are also required to track and report a record of their 
monthly OPTAR (OFC-50) expenses to CNAP. Tracking and reporting expenses is the 
responsibility of the air station IMA and comptroller shop, and is accomplished by 
submitting FHCRs. FHCRs reflect the amount of all OFC-50 funds obligated by the air 
station/CV in direct support of each squadron. The FHCR records costs by: 
• Type Equipment Code (TEC) 
• Organization code - which squadron incurred the obligation 
• Obligations by repairable and consumable fund codes 
• Posting the remaining OFC-50 balance [Ref. 3:p. 36] 
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The FHCR is submitted automatically via the Standard Accounting and 
Reporting System - Field Level (STARS-FL) database. The STARS receives its input 
from the air station/CV I-level Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management 
Information System (NALCOMIS) and supply Shipboard Uniform Automated Data 
Processing System (SUADPS). At the end of each month, after the STARS database 
summarizes the total obligated funds, CNAP comptroller personnel review the FHCR to 
monitor all cost, obligation and execution rates for the FHP [Ref. 3:p.36]. 
2. Carrier Air Wing Commander (CAG) - Allocation/Execution 
The carrier air wing commanders (CAGs) play a limited role in FHP allocation 
and execution. Quarterly OPTAR funding is issued by the controlling CAG to most 
fleet-going squadrons. For non-deploying squadrons, the OPTAR grant is issued directly 
by CNAP or by the Type Wing Commander. The CAG's role during allocation and 
execution is that of monitoring and distributing funds. If a particular squadron within an 
air wing requires additional funding within the fiscal year, the Air Wing Operations 
Officer will distribute funds from one squadron to another. Distribution is done to 
alleviate shortfalls or funding surpluses brought on by unforeseen operating schedules 
within the Air Wing. If unable to sufficiently redistribute funds within the Air Wing, the 
CAG will solicit additional funding directly from CNAP [Ref. 3:p. 37]. 
3. Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) 
a.        Budget Formulation 
Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific plays an important role in FHP 
budget formulation by representing the flying hour users' needs and articulating the 
difficulties to the resource sponsor (N-78) in executing the FHP budget.   The CNAP 
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budget formulation role consists of two activities: 1) collecting and reporting FHP 
execution data and 2) developing FHP program and budget submissions [Ref. 3:p. 37]. 
FHP execution data come from the BOR and FHCR that provide the basis 
for constructing FHP OP-20 budget exhibits. The accuracy of these reports is important 
to ensure sufficient future FHP funding levels. CNAP monitors and audits BOR and 
FHCR data on a monthly basis to ensure their accuracy. Then CNAP forwards this 
information electronically to N-78F where it is collected in the Flying Hour Projection 
System (FHPS) database [Ref. 14:pp.53 & 57]. 
b.        Funding Allocation and Execution 
CNAP is the focal point for allocating, executing and monitoring flight 
hour funding for all Navy and Marine Corps Pacific fleet squadrons. Their primary goal 
and responsibility during allocation and execution is to achieve a specific level of 
readiness for each squadron within the constraints of the resources available. Separate 
discussions of allocation and execution follow [Ref. 3:p. 41]. 
(1) Allocation. The allocation of FHP funding begins at the 
start of the new fiscal year when FMB distributes quarterly allocations of the approved 
FHP funding to CNAP in the form of an Operating Budget (OB). The FHP OB, in 
theory, should provide the necessary dollars to execute CNAP's flying mission. With 
restricted DoD budgets and competing priorities, financial resources are scarce. Thus, 
the funds requested during budget formulation seldom actually match those required by 
CNAP to execute the FHP program. Therefore, CNAP's greatest challenge during 
allocation is to distribute these funds in such a way that will allow squadrons to achieve 
mission readiness while avoiding over obligation of FHP funds [Ref. 3:p. 41]. 
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CNAP's primary tool for distributing flight hour funds is through 
the Navy Operational Plan 20 (OP-20). The OP-20 serves as a budgeting formulation 
document and an execution-monitoring tool. During budgeting, the OP-20 displays 
funding requirements by aircraft type, model, series (T/M/S) and becomes the Navy's 
primary budget exhibit displaying the FHP funding requirements during submission and 
review to OSD and OMB. Once funding is approved, the OP-20 provides local 
commanders with a means to allocate squadron OPTAR grants by: 
• The annual number of flight hours that may be flown by each T/M/S 
aircraft 
• The dollar amounts budgeted for each flight hour by T/M/S 
• The total dollar amounts authorized for the three OPTAR cost components 
(fuel, AVDLR and maintenance). 
By using the OP-20, the CNAP FHP manager and comptroller 
decide how to allocate flight hours to each squadron, air wing, and aircraft-owning 
activity, taking into account deployment schedules, and training requirements [Ref. 3:p. 
42]. 
In distributing OPTAR funds to squadrons and air stations, the OP- 
20 serves as a starting point. The Flying Hour Program Division (N01F3) and the 
Aviation Flight Hour Operations Office (N-3F) share the process of distributing FHP 
funds. The FHP manager CN01F3) is charged with the overall management of the 
program, but shares this responsibility with N-3F. N-3F, (also called the FHP Operations 
Officer (Ops-O)), is responsible for ensuring squadrons are allocated the proper number 
of flight hours and associated funding levels required to meet CNO's readiness goals for 
aircraft [Ref. 15]. To determine how many hours to allocate each squadron the CNAP 
Ops-0 uses five documents:  1) Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) 
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Report, 2) Required Operational Capability/Projected Operational Environment 
(ROC/POE) 3) Aviation Training and Readiness Matrix, 4) OP-20, and 5) the Secretary 
of the Navy's Department of the Navy Consolidated Planning and Programming 
Guidance (DNCPPG). A short description of these documents follows [Ref. 3:p. 42]. 
The SORTS manual defines specific mission proficiency 
requirements necessary to achieve the various combat readiness ("C") ratings, which are 
reported to the CNO and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). "C" ratings are a percentage 
measurement of how mission ready a unit is to operate in combat. The ROC/POE 
delineates combat capabilities and mission areas for each T/M/S expected during 
wartime. The Training and Readiness Matrix (T & R Matrix) is a detailed Joint 
CNAP/CNAL instruction that provides guidance by T/M/S, mission, and specific goals 
for crew competency levels necessary to achieve a particular "C" rating in the SORTS 
Report. The DNCPPG establishes a measure termed Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) 
which serves as a subjective means to distribute a limited number of flight hour funds 
among the various activities. PMR is the number of flight hours required to complete all 
events scheduled on the T & R Matrix. Completing all events is known as 100 percent 
PMR. PMR is currently maintained at a Navy wide rate of 83 percent plus 2 percent of 
the flying hours-performed in aircraft simulators [Ref. 3:p.43J. 
The first three documents, SORTS, ROC/POE and T &R Matrix 
are tools used by squadron CO's in determining how to allocate their flying hours. At 
CNAP, the Ops O takes these documents into consideration but, because of the 
complexity in trying to balance the requirements of all five documents, he primarily relies 
on the OP-20 and the 83 percent PMR goal to distribute flight hours by T/M/S. The OP- 
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20 assists in the allocation of funds to the fleet as it is separated into three schedules to 
reflect different mission areas. Each T/M/S is funded to a slightly different level of hours 
and dollar amounts because of differences in operating expenses, e.g., jets versus 
helicopters. These schedules serve as a rough guideline for flight hour OPTAR 
distribution throughout the fleet. Schedules are introduced as follows [Ref. 11]: 
• Schedule        Mission/Definition 
• A        TACAIR/ASW - Carrier air wings, Marine air wings, land 
and sea based units committed to combat operations funded at 83 
percent PMR. This category constitutes the bulk of the Navy / 
Marine Corps aviation warfighting capability, which primarily 
consists of those squadrons capable of executing the "joint strike" 
and "crisis response" missions in support of the National Military 
Strategy. (1 Al A fund code) 
B FLEET AIR TRAINING (FAT) - This category (also 
referred to as Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS)), consists of 
squadrons that train pilots and navigators prior to joining 
TACAIR/ASW and Fleet Air Support units. These squadrons are 
dedicated to training fleet aircrews in each particular type aircraft 
and funded at 100 percent student throughput. (1A2A fund code) 
C FLEET AIR SUPPORT (FAS) - The primary mission of 
these squadrons is to provide direct and indirect support (including 
logistics) to Navy and Marine Corps fleet operating units and shore 
installations. Their funding is based on Naval Center for Cost 
Analyses (NCCA) methodologies and historical execution. 
Common mission examples include Carrier-on-Board Delivery, 
and Search and Recovery. (1 Al A fund code) 
The percentage of FHP resources spent for squadrons within the above schedules 
is indicated in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5.      FHP Schedule Funding Percentages [Ref. 13]. 
In conjunction with the OP-20, final distribution of funding to fleet 
squadrons is calculated by matching squadron flying "activity levels" with the CNO PMR 
goal of 83 percent.   An activity level indicates a phase of employment for a squadron 
during its 18 month "turn-around deployment cycle."    A turn-around cycle is the 
eighteen-month period used for scheduling aircraft deployments, along with all the 
requisite aircraft and air wing training in preparation for deployment.    Flight hour 
requirements vary at each stage of the turn-around cycle. Air wings are typically funded 
at the levels shown below: 
Month 1:        Personnel turnover and leave 40% PMR 
Months 2-6: Turn-around training 65% PMR 
Months 7-10: Turn-around training 75% PMR 
Months 11-16: Pre-deployment training 95% PMR 
Month 17: Pre-deployment Stand down 50% PMR 
Deployment Month 1: 70% PMR 
Deployment Months 2-5: 115% PMR 
Deployment Month 6: 60% PMR 
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Using the 83 percent PMR goal as guidance, the CNAP Ops-0 
uses the OP-20 schedule and builds quarterly master flight hour execution plans for each 
air wing once CINCPACFLT passes the "controls" (fiscal FHP dollar limits) to CNAP. 
The objective is to attain an overall PMR goal of 83 percent while ensuring squadrons 
receive necessary funding to fly enough flight hours to meet training requirements. As 
illustrated in Figure 3.6, the level of funding and flight hours required varies from the 83 
percent PMR baseline depending on squadron location within the turnaround cycle. In 
the aggregate, an 83 percent PMR level is achieved. In addition to achieving the 83 
percnet PMR goal, the Ops-0 and FHP mangers must avoid any over obligation of FHP 
funds and a resulting 1517 Anti-deficiency Act violation [Ref. 3:p. 45]. 
Following endorsement by the air wing commander, the flight hour 
execution plan is approved at CNAP and the Flight Hour Manager's staff distributes the 
quarterly OPTAR grants to the air wings, squadrons and air stations by naval message. 
Receipt of this message provides authority for activities to obligate FHP funds. 
(2)       Execution. CNAP's monitoring role in FHP execution is to 
track and review squadron and air station obligations.   CNAP does this through the 
FHCR and BOR costing information reports. These reports serve to: 
Prevent over expenditure of allocated funds 
Ensure funds are used for approved purposes only 
Compare squadron, air wing and air station readiness training and support 
activities to current on-hand FHP funds 
Identify excess funds for redistribution to other units 
Measure ship/station/squadron budget execution performance 
Support and provide justification for subsequent fiscal year budget inputs 
and decisions 
Prepare required FHP management control reports [Ref. 3:p. 46] 
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Figure 3.6       CNAP 24 Month Carrier Air Wing Deployment Cycle [Ref. 13]. 
The FHCRs and BORs provide a feedback mechanism to CNAP 
on the status of funds for each unit, as well as a check and balance to prevent over 
obligation or inappropriate obligations of funds. The FHCR delineates fiscal year to date 
information on the amount of flight hours flown and the obligations for fuel, maintenance 
and AVDLR expenses. The CNAP FHP Manager monitors FHCR and BOR inputs 
against the OP-20 cost per hour guidance to detect any anomalies. When funding 
shortfalls occur, the FHP Manager reallocates funds between the squadrons and the air 
stations, or requests additional funding from CINCPACFLT and N-78 [Ref. 3:p. 46]. 
Overseeing the distribution of flight hour funds within 
CINPACFLT requires a tremendous management effort between the squadrons, air 
stations, air wing commanders, and the resource sponsor.   At any given time, FHP 
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managers are monitoring the execution of five air wings, a dozen air stations, and over 
100 squadrons. The final objective is to spread the limited FHP funding across all 
activities while achieving mission readiness goals and to ensure the proper execution of 
all allocated funds by the end of the fiscal year [Ref. 3:p. 47]. 
The Marine aviation organizations that fall under CNAP's purview 
for budgeting and funding purposes are the 1st and 3rd Marine Air Wings (MAWS). 
Operationally these two MAWS report to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces 
Pacific (FMFPAC). FMFPAC FHP managers track Marine aviation squadron 
expenditures and work closely with CNAP in monitoring and reporting Marine Corps 
FHP execution. CNAP and FMFPAC attempt to develop coordinated execution 
strategies, but divergent requirements between the Navy and Marine Corps sometimes 
make that difficult. Budget execution strategies will be discussed in depth in the next 
chapter. 
4.        Commander in Chief United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) 
The primary function of CINCPACFLT as the major claimant is to act as an 
interface between CNAP, FMB and the resource sponsor, N-78F. These responsibilities 
and functions are grouped into two areas: budget formulation, and budget allocation and 
execution. A discussion of these functions and responsibilities follows [Ref. 3:p. 47]. 
a.        Budget Formulation 
During FHP budget formulation, CINCPACFLT receives three input 
documents: FHP fiscal control limits, the budget policy and formulation guidance, both 
from the FMB analyst, and a copy of the proposed OP-20 FHP budget exhibit as 
developed by N-78F.   Since CNAP primarily oversees the day-to-day execution of the 
FHP, CINCPACFLT budget personnel forward these documents to CNAP.  The CNAP 
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staff validates these documents against the control limits and the OP-20 to ensure 
sufficient funds are available to execute the FHP. Using the Aviation Cost Evaluation 
System (ACES), CNAP compares proposed OP-20 budget documents from one year to 
the next to determine if changes between the two years are executable. Analysis is done 
by matching the flight hours to the control amounts. If funding shortages are identified, 
CNAP can reprogram funds and flight hours within the overall allocation limit or request 
additional FHP funding from CINCPACFLT [Ref. 3:p. 48]. 
b.        Budget Allocation & Execution 
CINCPACFLT responsibilities in the allocation and execution phase of 
the FHP can result in significant decisions that directly impact the successful execution of 
the FHP. The CINCPACTFLT Execution Branch distributes quarterly FHP funding to 
CNAP as received from FMB. However, before these funds are allocated at the 
beginning of a new fiscal year, an analysis of the funding levels for each of the Navy 
CINC's programs is conducted. If this analysis determines any of the CINC's programs 
are inadequately funded, CINCPACFLT leadership may determine that reprogramming 
funds between programs is necessary. Some CINCPACFLT reprogramming decisions 
result in the transfer of funds from the FHP account to other CINC programs. 
Reprogramming decisions can dramatically impact the daily operation of the FHP at 
CNAP and result in a number of additional challenges in managing this already difficult 
program [Ref. 3:p. 49]. 
Since CNAP is the principle manager of the FHP, CINCPACFLT 
delegates the FHP execution responsibility to him. However, CINCPACFLT budget 
analysts and operations personnel monitor the program through daily telephone calls and 
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program monitoring. These personnel monitor CNAP FHP obligation rates to see how 
funds are being spent, and conduct monthly reviews of the program by T/M/S to ensure 
fleet readiness goals are being achieved, and to discover potential mission trouble areas 
[Ref. 3:p. 49]. 
The next chapter will review FHP budget execution at CNAP during fiscal 
years 1998, 1999, and 2000. Budget execution strategies, techniques, and trends will be 
discussed in view of perennial program under-funding. 
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IV.    FLYING HOUR PROGRAM BUDGET EXECUTION AT 
COMMANDER NAVAL AIR FORCES PACIFIC: 1998,1999,2000 
A.        ENVIRONMENT    OF    COMPETING    PRIORITIES    AND    LIMITED 
RESOURCES 
Budget execution is ultimately where the FHP budget is validated to assess 
whether sufficient funds have been forecasted and allocated to achieve the flying hour 
requirements of CNAP. Because of overall federal budget constraints, competing 
priorities and limited resources, the final version of the OP-20 often contains less funding 
than the originally budgeted OP-20. The hope and expectation during the execution year 
is that the actual FHP cost data are relatively consistent with the budget estimates. 
However, in recent years, execution costs for CNAP's FHP have exceeded the budgeted 
estimates. When FMB passes the "controls" (fiscal FHP dollar limits) to CINCPACFLT, 
there are less resources available than necessary to fully execute the FHP. 
CINCPACFLT passes additional controls to CNAP reflecting managerial decisions 
(withholds) that may rcprogram FHP funds for other priorities. 
The most influential factor creating FHP funding problems is the fact that there 
are limited resources to fund any program among competing priorities within the DoN. 
A constrained fiscal environment and other spending priorities often drive unpopular 
funding decisions. When this occurs, the onus is on CNAP FHP managers and 
comptrollers to embark upon "creative financing" to try to achieve aviation readiness 
goals without committing an Anti-deficiency Act violation. 
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B.        TRENDS IN CNAP'S ANNUAL FHP EXECUTION 
1.        Beginning of the Fiscal Year 
CNAP FHP managers start each fiscal year recognizing that there are insufficient 
funds to continue operations through the end of the year.   CNAP continuously updates 
CINCPACFLT on their money position. At the start of the fiscal year, CINCPACFLT's 
execution philosophy and direction to CNAP is to fly the requirement, making necessary 
expenditures in order to properly execute the program. As the year continues, the reality 
at CNAP is that they must fly to the dollars. 
CNAP normally requests a higher percentage of annual funds for the first quarter 
of the fiscal year in order to "buy back" the previous year's bow wave. (Bow waves are 
discussed later in this chapter.) For example, CNAP requested 28 percent of total FHP 
funds for first quarter FY 01. CNAP is required to provide justification up the chain of 
command for requesting quarterly funds in excess of 25 percent of annual funding. 
When CNAP managers determine that there are insufficient funds to continue through the 
end of a particular quarter, they may request that CINCPACFLT advance money from a 
later quarter into the current quarter. CINCPACFLT is the custodian for numerous 
operating funds, including those for Pacific fleet surface and submarine communities, and 
may or may not have resources available to advance to CNAP for the FHP. CNAP 
managers prefer not to request advances from CINCPACFLT unless absolutely 
unavoidable [Ref. 15]. 
2.        Reprogramming 
During the execution of FHP funds, several opportunities exist to shift or 
reprogram FHP dollars. This occurs because of changing priorities, and insufficient 
funding levels for other programs.  Reprogramming is designed to give operational and 
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financial commanders increased flexibility to meet unforeseen program changes that may 
occur during budget execution. With approval from the chain of command, CNAP FHP 
managers can reprogram up to $15 million between fund codes [Ref. 16]. They shift 
money within the FHP from an under-executed account (if one exists) to an over- 
executed account. In the second quarter of FY 01, CNAP shifted money from 
TACAIR/ASW (1 Al A fund code) to the smaller FAT (1A2A fund code) in order to close 
out quarterly budgets in the black. When CNAP managers shift resources between fund 
codes, often money is moved from 1A1A to 1A2A. The priority resides with the smaller 
FRS account that provides funding for training replacement pilots and other aircrew [Ref. 
15]. 
CNAP managers routinely reprogram money from the FHP to the smaller Flying 
Other (FO) account that has experienced under-funding the past several years. Even 
though detrimental from a cash management perspective, augmenting some of these 
programs out of the current year FHP budget is essential. For example, if missile range 
and/or temporary assignment of duty (TAD) funding is inadequate, squadrons may not be 
able to achieve the required training because they can't fully utilize the facilities and pay 
the travel expenses for people, regardless of the available flight hours. The support 
programs are integral to achieving the readiness milestones necessary to deploy a combat 
capable force. 
3.        Quarterly Shortfalls 
CNAP has problems each quarter with requirements exceeding available cash. As 
the funds provider to operating units, they do not want to order squadrons to stop flying 
operations because of a cash flow problem.   The distribution of funding on a quarterly 
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basis causes CNAP to experience timing issues for incurring liabilities. The problem is 
similar to a bank obtaining coverage by the federal reserve. The bank knows the money 
is there, but has not yet received it. As available resources are spent toward the end of a 
quarter, CNAP managers know that the new quarter's resources will come, but cash has 
not yet been distributed by CINCPACFLT. 
4.        Execution Philosophy 
During the first seven months of FY 01, CNAP managers' estimates for the 
current year FHP funding shortfall have ranged from $250 to $325 million. The entire 
shortfall does not manifest itself all in the fourth quarter; rather, it works its way through 
the year. The CNO directs CINCPACFLT to fly 83 percent PMR, and CNAP must 
determine how to accomplish this aviation readiness goal. They monitor overall daily 
spending rates and consider timing of employment of the aircraft carriers in the 
deployment cycle. CNAP managers must make decisions such as how low to deplete 
flying hours of the two Air Wings at home. Because of enormous funding shortfalls, in a 
worst-case scenario, they ma> have to temporarily halt flying operations of squadrons 
returning from deployment. Part of the job of CNAP managers is to ensure that 
squadrons among the T AC AIR. helicopter, patrol, and other aviation communities 
equally "share the pain" of under-funding. With the limited funds available and number 
of reporting units, trying to properly allocate resources to the squadrons throughout the 
year becomes a huge cash flou juggling act [Ref. 15]. 
If CNAP managers communicate an impending funding shortfall to the fleet, units 
may constrain themselves because of money. CNAP managers promote prudent program 
execution yet avoid constraining fleet flying.   The signals that CNAP managers send 
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during execution are very important. Limiting fleet operations because of money 
shortfalls would artificially reduce the FHP, ultimately misrepresenting its true cash 
requirements. This would be detrimental because the starting point in budget formulation 
for future years is what is spent in the current year. 
5.        Challenges with Reporting Units 
Once CNAP managers distribute quarterly funding to the fleet, managing flying 
hour execution rates and maintenance expenditures is the responsibility of individual 
squadrons, air stations, and other reporting units. Although managers at CNAP direct 
fleet units to fly the requirements and not to be constrained by available dollars, some 
Commanding Officers may view requesting additional funds as a poor reflection on their 
command. Therefore, command influence at the unit level plays a role in execution. 
Commanding Officers may attempt to stretch available dollars with various management 
techniques. Canceling requisitions for aircraft parts, rescheduling training events, or 
delaying needed aircraft maintenance are methods to temporarily defer costs. With over 
one hundred different reporting units, there are different levels of management 
controlling in the execution process and different styles within the various units. 
Additional challenges with which CNAP FHP managers must contend include 
accuracy and timeliness in reporting by units. Reporting errors in a unit's 7B (fuel) 
OPTAR may occur on calculations with fuel chits, causing unexpected overages or 
shortages in OFC-01 accounts. CNAP must be extremely careful about overspending 
their accounts. Because of a lag in reporting obligations, not all costs are captured by the 
accounting system in the quarter in which they occur. Often bills exist for which CNAP 
is liable, yet CNAP may be unaware of their existence.   CNAP must routinely manage 
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the risk of Anti-deficiency Act violations because requirements often exceed final 
monetary authority. 
6.        Conclusion of Fiscal Year 
As CNAP managers continue to monitor daily FHP expenditure rates throughout 
the year, available cash dwindles. They have advanced money as far forward as possible 
and can now project a date that they will have to completely stop all fleet operations 
because all money will be expended. This date is usually in early to mid fourth quarter. 
To continue operations, managers must rely on funding relief to overcome shortfalls. 
As shortfalls are communicated up the chain of command, CNAP money 
managers monitor progress on potential sources of funding relief to know when to order 
all fleet units to stop spending and cease operations. CNAP managers describe the 
process as trying to determine "when and how hard to slam on the brakes" [Ref. 15]. 
They do not know if funding relief will be forthcoming, how much it will be, nor when it 
will occur. 
7.        Funding Relief 
One form of funding relief comes from the distribution of "contingency funds." 
Contingency funds are appropriated by Congress to offset costs of ongoing "known" 
operations. An example of known contingency funds were those used to fund Operation 
Southern Watch (OSW) in Iraq in FY 98. These funds came from the Overseas 
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) and once appropriated by Congress and 
released by OSD are held by FMB and provided only when fleet operations in direct 
support of contingencies exceed the appropriated FHP budget. "Unknown" contingency 
funds are appropriated through emergency supplemental bills to cover unforeseen 
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contingencies. An example of unknown contingency funds were the funds passed in July 
1998 to cover the unplanned costs of deploying a second aircraft carrier to the Persian 
Gulf. 
The use of contingency funds to finance FHP shortfalls is currently under debate 
[Ref. 17]. In theory, contingency funding is designed to be purely incremental. To some 
people within various levels of the FHP financial organization, it appears that CNAP is 
using contingency funds to offset pricing problems in the OP-20. Contingency funds are 
not supposed to offset a pricing problem; rather their intended use is to support the extra 
financial burden of flying contingencies above the normal level of operations. From 
CNAP's point of view, without contingency dollars they would be unable to make it 
through the year. 
Additional sources of funding relief may come from CNO Reserve (withhold at 
the CNO level), reprogramming from other accounts within the DoD appropriation (for 
example from procurement accounts), or Defense supplemental appropriations from 
Congress. 
If units within CNAP are flying high sortie rates in support of contingencies 
during the first quarter of the fiscal year, they may expend cash faster than is available. 
This is another case in which CNAP will request to move money forward. CNAP 
managers describe this as "covering contingencies out-of-hide." They are loaning 
themselves their own money to pay the cost of contingencies until reimbursed later in the 
fiscal year. CNAP managers continually attempt to reconcile timing issues associated 
with the expenditure and receipt of cash. 
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The Navy mid-year review process affords CNAP managers another opportunity 
to communicate shortfalls up the chain of command. Following mid-year review, the 
critical question becomes "Will we get the funding relief requested in the mid-year 
review process from a Defense Supplemental appropriation or some other mechanism 
toward the end of the fiscal year?" When CNAP does receive funding relief, but the 
amount received is insufficient to meet requirements, they then scramble to figure out 
how to make it through the end of the year. For example, they conduct "what if drills of 
shutting down Air Wings for 30 days to 60 days to determine how much they could avoid 
spending. 
8.        Withholds 
The FHP is the largest financial account that CNAP manages, and has been 
subject to withholds to fix other funding shortfalls. CNAP has no control over these 
types of "reprioritizations" imposed by higher levels in the chain of command. These 
actions affect not only the FHP budget, but other OM&N accounts as well. Budget 
managers do not know what will be the final withhold or tax that will be levied against 
their programs, but monitor discussions in the summer review process. By the time the 
fiscal year starts and the budget has been received, managers concern themselves with 
execution, and cannot influence decisions to tax their program. 
Over the past several years CINCPACFLT has withheld money from the FHP 
account to fund enhanced fleet computer operability with initiatives such as the Navy- 
Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), Y2K improvements, and Information Technology for the 
21st Century (IT-21) [Ref. 17]. 
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9.        Unanticipated Expenses 
Another challenge in executing the FHP is the annual occurrence of unexpected 
expenditures. These expenditures are often significant and can cause major fiscal 
difficulties for CNAP FHP managers. These unanticipated expenses are referred to as 
"emergent unfundeds." Emergent unfundeds generally arise because of unforeseen 
maintenance costs associated with reliability problems with aircraft components. The 
fleet issues maintenance bulletins because of a mishap or inspection that uncovers a 
defect that may ground an entire aircraft type until the problem is corrected. 
Over the past several years, AV-8B aircraft have suffered numerous engine 
component failures. On 5 OCT 2000, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 
issued a Flight Restriction Message grounding AV-8B aircraft powered by F402-RR- 
408B engines because of a dual component failure of the primary and backup enhanced 
variable inlet guide vane controller system experienced during a ground start sequence 
[Ref. 18]. The FHP is not resourced to fund these types of engine repairs that require 
engineering investigations and testing. Often, however, FHP funds are used to pay for 
repairs to aircraft that have been grounded or "red-striped" when NAVAIR does not have 
procurement (APN-5) funds available. 
Marine Corps AV-8B and H-53 aircraft have recently experienced numerous 
failures, which have resulted in grounding of these airframes. Normal operating costs of 
these two aircraft comprise approximately half of the Marine Corps portion of the FHP. 
Because of their recent groundings, the Marines under-executed their portion of the FHP 
budget for first quarter FY 01 [Ref. 15]. 
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C.       ANNUAL COST DEFERMENT METHODS 
1.        Bow-Waving 
The primary annual financing mechanism that CNAP uses to sustain flying 
operations through the fiscal year is called "bow-waving."    Bow-waving refers to 
deferring the cost of something from the current fiscal year to the next fiscal year. CNAP 
uses this technique with Aviation Depot Level Repair parts (AVDLRs) in order to keep 
aircraft operating. When a Ready for Issue (RFI) repair part is taken from the "shelf the 
bad or broken part is inducted into the depot facility for repair if the item cannot be fixed 
at the Aviation Intermediate Maintenance activity (AIMD). To prevent the charge in the 
current fiscal year, the AIMDs will retain the AVDLRs until the next fiscal year.  This 
cash flow technique enables fleet units to continue flying when the budget would have 
been exhausted if the AVDLRs were processed.   However, the practice of bow-waving 
ensures further under-funding in the future because the costs of the bow-wave are not part 
of OP-20 pricing. Table 4.1 shows the cost of AVDLRs that were bow-waved in the past 
four fiscal years. 





Table 4.1.       Bow-Waved Amounts [Ref. 15]. 
2.        Unfilled Customer Orders (UCOs) 
Another cash flow transaction CNAP has used to get through the 
execution year is Unfilled Customer Orders (UCOs). UCOs are a cash flow generating 
strategy in which fleet operating units administratively cancel or de-obligate outstanding 
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requisitions for AVDLRs to recover the cash as a means to pay for more urgent 
requirements. This strategy is a mechanism used by CNAP to prevent over-obligation of 
budgeted FHP funds. Under the agreement between CNAP and Navy Inventory Control 
Point (NAVICP), all requisitions cancelled must be re-ordered within 45 days after the 
new fiscal year [Ref. 3:p. 181]. 
D.       BATHTUB EFFECT 
As CNAP managers have struggled to maintain the viability of FHP budgets, they 
have been forced to reduce funding allotted to squadrons in the Inter-Deployment 
Training Cycle (IDTC). The resultant reduction of flying hours and PMR for squadrons 
has created what CNAP managers refer to as the bathtub effect (Figure 4.1). The height 
of operating tempo occurs during deployment for Naval forces. As units return to the 
United States from overseas deployments, some crews rotate and new replacement 
personnel arrive, there is an expected decrease in the level of flying from the high tempo 
of deployment. Within the first couple of months upon returning, leave, training and 
rotations occur. Readiness levels decrease as crews are dismantled and the process of 
training for the next deployment begins [Ref. 17]. 
To stay safe and proficient however, flying still occurs but at reduced levels from 
deployment. As funding levels have been reduced in recent years, the easiest target for 
reduction of flying has become the "home guard" squadrons. The trend in recent years is 
to reduce IDTC squadrons to lower levels of PMR. 
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Figure 4.1.      Bathtub Effect. 
Although difficult to quantify for the entire force, CNAP managers report 
aggregate PMR execution rates of 57-60 percent for carrier aviation squadrons from the 
month of return from deployment through the tenth month prior to deployment for fiscal 
years 1998 to 2000. For FY 01, funding for this same time period in the IDTC has been 
reduced to 53 percent PMR [Ref. 17]. 
As the depth of the bathtub increases, proficiency atrophies as pilots fly fewer 
hours per month. The real concern of planners is that there is a steeper ramp going on 
deployment coming out of IDTC. As aircrews are faced with increasing intensity and 
more challenging flying during deployment, their skills may not match the level of flying 
required because of the reduction in flying hours throughout the IDTC. 
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E.        MARINE CORPS EXECUTION STRATEGY 
Marine Corps execution strategy does not include the bathtub effect, because they 
do not have an IDTC. Without a deployed versus home guard mentality, all Marine 
Corps units must be ready to deploy at all times, retaining higher readiness levels. The 
Marine Corps portion of CNAP's FHP is smaller than the Navy's program (35 percent to 
65 percent split) and affords less flexibility to reduce PMR. Marine Corps execution 
philosophy, in general, is to fly all units at the same level, not reducing PMR regardless 
of financial shortfalls. In theory, when they run out of money, they stop operations* 
completely. Although the Marine Corps' philosophy of continuing to fly the requirement 
and then completely canceling operations when money is expended has the appearance of 
Draconian tactics or bnnksmanship, they have yet to actually shut down squadrons [Ref. 
19]. However, it is a more cost conscious approach and has the advantage of quickly 
garnering senior leadership attention. 
Connected to Marine Corps FHP execution strategy is implementation of the 
Marine Aviation Campaign Plan (MACP) that began in FY 97. The objective of this 
concept is to maximize aviation combat readiness within the resources available. It is a 
shift driven by many factors including safety, manning and aircraft material condition. It 
incorporates a need to change the rate at which the Marine Corps flies its aircraft and by a 
requirement to provide for the long-term health of both its people and equipment. The 
MACP was designed to move away from the FHP paradigm that rewards flying an OP-20 
projection regardless of its supportability. The key concept behind the MACP is to better 
balance resources against readiness requirements [Ref. 20]. The MACP is based on the 
system used by the Air Force to allocate flying money. 
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F.        FISCAL YEAR 1998 
In October 1997, the CNAP FHP balance sheet showed an estimated $163 million 
shortfall for fiscal year 1998 (Table 4.2). This shortfall was due to a combination of 
issues, including under-pricing of the OP-20 cost per hour (CPH). A decision was made 
by FMB in July of FY 96 to not recognize FHP cost escalation during the POM 98 
summer review. Due to funding constraints, FMB chose not to re-price the FHP and 
allocate additional funding to adjust for this cost growth. The overall impact of that 
« affordability decision resulted in a flawed budget base that was perpetuated throughout 
the POM. Although a new approach by N-78 was in place using the most recent year's 
execution costs instead of a three year moving average, the forecasting methodology was 
deficient in not including the previous year bow wave cost in the following year forecast. 
The reason the previous year's bow wave was not included was because of limited 
resources and other funding priorities. The estimated bow wave cost that was rolled into 
FY 98 from FY 97 was $65 million [Ref. 21]. 
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Table 4.2.       CNAP's Initial FY 98 FHP Balance Sheet [Ref. 21]. 
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In addition to the buy back of both the UCO and AVDLR bow waves, other items 
adding to the shortfall included previously known critical unfunded requirements, 
increased costs of AVDLRs that were not accounted for in the OP-20, and proposed 
reprogramming of some FHP dollars to the Flying Other (FO) account. The 
reprogramming was for several of the smaller programs such as TAD, ranges, and staff 
headquarters. CNAP managers decided that in order to have a fully executable FHP, 
these programs needed to be funded at the FY 97 minimally executable level. Thus, the 
decision was made to reprogram $24 million from the FHP to restore these under-funded 
programs. These issues, in addition to an initial delta of $116 million between the OP-20 
and the controls that were received from CINCPACFLT comptrollers, resulted in a 
shortfall of $271 million. 
To offset this shortfall, CNAP looked at every possible asset in order to arrive at 
an executable program. These assets included funding credits received from 
decommissioning the USS Independence and the home port change of the USS Nimitz 
from San Diego to the East Coast. Also included were expenditure reporting delays 
resulting from the change of aircraft carriers' accounting systems to STARS. CNAP 
managers also assumed eventual receipt of Congressional supplemental funding and a 
continuation of the historic level of reimbursables. CNAP is reimbursed for flying 
operations strictly in support of certain events. For example, flying hour costs are 
reimbursable for foreign military sales (FMS) demonstration flights for foreign 
governments considering American aircraft purchases. CNAP managers also counted 
excess hours identified by FMFPAC from the newly implemented MACP as another 
asset. In total, CNAP's balance sheet conveyed a very optimistic view that held nothing 
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in reserve, but still forecasted a shortfall of $163 million, split between Navy and Marine 
Corps. It even included $30 million in maintenance efficiencies, which had yet to 
materialize [Ref. 21]. 
The FY 98 execution strategy focused on the following goals: 
Achieving 83 percent PMR 
Ensuring all forces deployed C-l or, at a minimum, C-2 
Fully funding the FRS 
Funding critical FO shortfall to ensure a balanced program 
Eliminating the bow wave that had been built up over the last two years 
As a result of discussions between CNAP and CINCPACFLT staff members in 
October 1997, CINCPACFLT agreed to fund the FHP at the OP-20 level as CNAP 
requested, restoring $116 million to the FHP. Although a $47 million shortfall remained, 
CNAP managers were optimistic that between further cost management initiatives and 
the option to fall back on another bow wave, this shortfall was manageable.  With that 
funding level, they decided to execute at an 83 percent PMR rate for the first quarter in 
order to deploy forces C-l or C-2, and fully fund Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS) 
and Fleet Air Support. This plan called for a re-evaluation after the first quarter to see if 
any adjustments were needed. 
However, the optimism from October was greatly reduced as the year progressed. 
With the cost of the bow wave included, CNAP started the year running about 30 percent 
above OP-20 CPH. Changes to funding were significant and placed the FHP in a difficult 
position. CNAP continued to monitor costs in order to find every possible efficiency. 
By March 1998. additional changes had taken place, further deteriorating the 
funding picture. Most notable was the withdrawal of funding that had been provided for 
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the buy back of Unfilled Customer Orders (UCOs) of $27.5 million. Table 4.2 "UCO buy 
back of $12 million" reflects the amount remaining ($10.5 million had already been 
bought back) to buy back $40.5 million of FY 97 UCOs at FY 98 prices ($50 million) 
minus the amount included in the controls ($27.5 million). Also, CNAP was directed to 
fund all temporary assignment of duty (TAD) after first quarter at the Proportional Meal 
Rate (PMR) instead of the less expensive Government Meal Rate (GMR). In addition, 
FMB recouped the excess hours that FMFPAC had identified as a result of the Marine 
Aviation Campaign Plan. The net result of these changes gave CNAP a much more 
challenging $105 million shortfall to work off from March through the last seven months 
of FY 98. 
CNAP's under-pricing estimate went up as a result of UCO withdrawal. FMB 
informed CNAP at the February 98 Flying Hour Conference that, while the UCO money 
had been reprogrammed to plus up the Manpower account, they had originally put an 
"extra" $29 million in the OP-20 that had become available from a $322 million 
Congressional plus up. This money had been in the OP-20 since October, and had been 
transparent to CNAP, as they still estimated it to be under-priced by $65 million. FMB's 
position was that even though the $27.5 million had been withdrawn, CNAP should be 
able to execute the FY 98 requirement since the "extra $29 million" was in the OP-20. In 
order to reflect their view of the budget, CNAP reduced the UCO shortfall by $29 million 
and transferred that shortfall to under-pricing. The bottom line is that CNAP lost $27.5 
million. 
Additionally, CNAP originally had another $10.5 million in the asset column, 
which was the difference between the funding that had been promised when they started 
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the UCO program, and what was actually put in the OP-20. CNAP intended to hold 
FMB's "feet to the fire" and briefed in October as "money we need CINCPACFLT help 
to go after during this execution year." With the withdrawal of the original $27.5 million, 
CNAP decided it was prudent to stop counting that additional $10.5 million as an asset. 
Thus, in total there was a $38 million loss [Ref. 21]. 
Also, the decision was made to put an additional carrier in the Gulf. The 
incremental cost of that added presence was estimated at $48 million per year. CNAP 
counted on getting this additional funding as a result of an Emergency Supplemental 
package that had been submitted. 
After the first several months of FY 98, units had "bought back" the $65 million 
of bow waved AVDLRs, and cost per hour (CPH) stabilized at 11-12 percent above OP- 
20 pricing. This meant that the FHP was under-priced by $72 million. 
In March 98, CNAP devised four potential options to get them through the 
remainder of the fiscal year: 
• OPTION 1: Continue flying at the 83 percent PMR level until the 19th of 
August when they expected to run out of money. Since two Air Wings 
were scheduled to deploy during the fourth quarter, this option was a 
"non-starter". 
• OPTION 2: Fly to the dollars with a uniform reduction of 17 percent 
across the force. This option would fund deploying units at 95 percent 
PMR instead of 115 percent PMR and would have a serious impact on 
readiness, as was the case when the Constellation Battle Group deployed 
in FY 97. 
OPTION 3: Fully rund the deployed units but shutdown home guard 
squadrons. There would be only two Air Wings at home during the fourth 
quarter and even after factoring in the Fleet Air Support squadrons, CNAP 
would not be able to make up the $79 million shortfall by "parking 
aircraft" alone. To make this option work, they would have to rely on 
shortfall reduction initiatives to make up $56 million and save the 
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• 
remaining $23 million by parking home guard units beginning 27 July for 
the remainder of the year. 
• OPTION 4: Continue shortfall reduction initiatives to realize $52 million 
of the shortfall and increase the bow wave to make up the remaining $27 
million. 
CNAP managers selected option 4 as the best course of action.    They were 
already counting on a $20 million AVDLR bow wave and $15 million in UCOs. Adding 
$27 million to the AVDLR bow wave would result in an unprecedented level of 
deferments into FY 99, and one that they were not entirely sure they could reach without 
impacting aircraft readiness before the end of FY 98. 
Additionally, the CNAP staff brainstormed a list of one-time initiatives to reduce 
or defer costs in four separate areas. Supply initiatives included turning in spare parts. 
Maintenance/AIMD initiatives included reducing AIMD overhead expenses, engine 
repair costs, and helicopter pack-up kit (PUK) costs. Budget initiatives included reducing 
Funding Other (FO) reprogramming and reducing IT-21 expenses. Operations initiatives 
included standing down units returning from deployment and canceling a bilateral 
US/Japanese exercise (RIMPAC) for USS Vinson and amphibious "L-deck" ships. 
Even realizing the full benefit of all these shortfall reduction initiatives would still- 
leave the FHP $27 million short. The only alternative, short of substantial mid year 
funding relief, was to increase the AVDLR bow wave an additional $27 million to bring 
the total to a $47 million USN AVDLR and $ 15 million USN UCO bow wave. However, 
in the end this plan would achieve three of their five primary goals (83 percent PMR, 
deploy C1/C2, fully fund FRS). 
With its aggressive cost reduction plan and by bow waving $26 million of 
AVDLRs, CNAP managers were able to get though the year without completely shutting 
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down operations.  By creating these internal efficiencies throughout the force and with 
Congressional funding relief, they executed 79.4 percent PMR for FY 98. 
G.       FISCAL YEAR 1999 
As FY 99 began, CNAP estimates of the total FHP shortfall for the year ranged 
from $101 to $112 million. They estimated CPH under-pricing in the OP-20 of $80 
million [Ref. 22]. In view of their financial position, they considered four separate 
execution options: 
• OPTION 1: Fly an aggregate 83 percent PMR until funds are exhausted. 
Assuming a $112 million shortfall for the year and an average $1.9 million 
expenditure rate per day for fuel alone, CNAP planners estimated 
operations would have to be stopped on the 2nd of August. 
• OPTION 2: Fly 83 percent PMR until the 1st of April and then reduce 
execution rates across the force by 25 percent. Adjusted USN/USMC 
TACAIR PMR for third and fourth quarters would be 61 percent. 
• OPTION 3: Completely stop operations for home guard squadrons. 
Shutting down two IDTC Air Wings would save $6.2 million per month. 
This option would require additional cost reductions as well. 
• OPTION 4: Execute the FHP at overall 83 percent PMR, ensuring that all 
forces deploy at C-l or C-2 and fully fund Fleet Replacement Squadrons 
(FRS). CNAP would re-evaluate CPH and execution performance in late 
first quarter and use a bow wave as a last resort. 
CNAP managers closely monitored execution rates and selected option 4 as the 
best option [Ref. 23]. 




CPH Under Pricing $ (44,000,000) 
Critical Unfunded Requirements $ (21,000,000) 
Reprogramming (Y2K, IT-21) $ (37,600,000) 
USN/USMC Bow Wave $ (26,000,000) 
Total $ (128,600,000) 
ASSETS 
Contingency dollars $ 49,300,000 
USN reimbursables $ 6,000,000 
USMC reimbursables $ 4,000,000 
Total $ 59,300,000 
FHP Delta $ (69,300,000) 
Table 4.3.       CNAP's First Quarter FY 99 FHP Balance Sheet [Ref. 24]. 
The overall FHP delta had decreased from initial estimates to approximately $69 
million primarily due to significantly lower CPH than first projected. However, 
numerous emergent unfunded requirements were occurring. Increasing contract 
maintenance costs, costs associated with repairing aging H-46 and H-53 helicopter 
transmissions and power units, and costs to overhaul AV-8B, F/A-18 and EA-6B engines 
were unanticipated costs that CNAP managers had to fund out of the FHP in order to 
keep execution rates up. Included in the pressure on CNAP's FHP budget was a decision 
by CINCPACFLT to withhold $23 million from the FHP to provide for Y2K funding. 
As the fiscal year continued, CNAP managers realized that they would be 
financially unable to continue operations even with the expected FY 99 Congressional 
supplemental funding.    Examining the 1A2A account, the FRS portion was already 
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funded below what they considered a minimum acceptable level. The Fleet Air Support 
(FAS) portion of the budget was also extremely lean. Thus, there was no room for 
further reduction in the 1A2A fund code. 
Cutting additional funding to the TACAIR/ASW (1A1A fund code) was the only 
option. CNAP managers ordered the reduction of aggregate PMR for TACAIR and 
Patrol Aviation squadrons (VP) to 76 percent. Returning Air Wings were funded at 40 
percent PMR for six months. Helicopter (HSL) squadron execution rate was held at 72 
percent PMR. 
At the close of FY 99, AIMDs were forced to slow down or suspend work 
because of a lack of available funds. Additionally, stock and pool supply items were 
depleted in order to avoid buying new parts. This impacted aircraft availability and 
operations into the start of FY 00. The Nimitz alone had $32 million of deferred 
purchases in FY 99. 
The final funding of FY 99's budget (excluding Take Charge and Move Out 
(TACAMO) funding) is shown in Table 4.4. 
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Controls from CINCPACFLT 
Control Plus/Minus 
Net Marks/PBD issues 
Contingency Funds 
CRB Decisions 
Y2K Plus Up 
FY99 Supplemental 
Total FHP Funds Available 
CINCPACFLT Withholds (Y2K, IT-21) 
CNAP reprogramming to Underfunded Programs 
(Staff OPTAR, Ranges, TAD, Simulators, AIMD) 











Table 4.4.       Final FY99 CNAP FHP Funding [Ref. 25]. 
With this total expenditure, CNAP was able to achieve an overall 80 percent 
PMR, but created a $55.5 million bow wave to reach year's end. This 80 percent 
execution, 3 percent short of the CNO goal, was due primarily to lack of parts and 
airframes associated with the year's end bow wave. 
To achieve the additional 3 percent to reach the CNO goal of 83 percent PMR, an 
additional $30 million would have been required. Therefore, from CNAP managers' 
viewpoint, the total cost in FY 99 to fly the full 83 percent PMR with no bow wave 
would have been another $85.5 million above the $1,338 million that was expended, for a 
total of $1,423.5 million ($133.5 million above OP-20 budget). 
In subsequent discussions, N78 and FMB contended that although not in the 
initial OP-20, sufficient funds to fully execute CNAP's FHP were eventually distributed 
to CINCPACFLT through the contingency and supplemental augments. They argued that 
during execution, CNAP's expenditure of $52.5 million on emergent unfunded bills were 
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rightfully NAVAIR bills. When discussed with NAVAIR representatives, they stated 
that they had no procurement (APN-5) funds available to apply to these unfunded bills, 
and obtaining necessary funding would have taken a long lead time [Ref. 25]. 
Additionally, N78 and FMB emphasized that they are not responsible for the 
reprogramming actions by CNAP nor withholds by CINCPACFLT. CNAP managers 
had reprogrammed $30 million during FY 99 execution to restore various smaller 
program funding to adequately execute the FHP. Also, neither N78 nor FMB denied that 
the $53 million expenditure for Y2K and IT-21 was required; the issue with budget 
officials was that it was not rightfully a FHP bill [Ref. 25]. 
H.       FISCAL YEAR 2000 
Assessing first quarter FY 00 execution data, the estimated FHP shortfall was 
$125 million (Table 4.5). Major contributors to the projected shortfall were the FY 99 
bow wave, a withhold by CINCPACFLT to pay for IT-21, CNAP reprogramming to 
augment under-funded FHP support programs, and emergent unfundeds. Emergent 
unfundeds included the cost of maintenance contract field teams being used to 
compensate for a shortage of trained personnel in AIMDs and unexpected P-3C and C- 
130 aircraft cost increases [Ref. 26]. 
60 
SHORTFALLS 
CPH Under Pricing $ (10,900,000) 
FMB FHP Deferral $ (39,400,000) 
East Timor Contingency Costs $ (9,900,000) 
CINCPACFLT Withhold $ (27,000,000) 
Reprogramming $ (19,000,000) 
Emergent Unfundeds $ (32,100,000) 
FY 99 Bow wave $ (55,500,000) 
Total $ (193,800,000) 
ASSETS 
Contingency dollars $ 49,000,000 
USN/USMC reimbursables $ 7,000,000 
USMC hours asset $ 12,600,000 
Total $ 68,600,000 
FHP Delta $ (125,200,000) 
Table 4.5.        CNAP's Initial FY 00 FHP Balance Sheet [Ref. 26]. 
However, reviewing the previous year's historical execution data, to fly an 83 
percent PMR program with no bow wave or inflation or other price increases would have 
cost $1,423.5 million. $1,256 million was currently available to fly the FY 00 program, 
equating to as much as a $167.5 million shortage from a fully funded program. These 
calculations assumed no further increase in emergent unfunded costs and no additional 
diversion of available FHP funds to other programs. 
Another issue that frustrated CNAP FHP staff was the discrepancy between their 
OP-20 funding and what was allotted to Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic (CNAL). 
OP-20 flight hour costs between CNAP and CNAL were substantially different for the 
same type/model/series (TMS) aircraft. In the aggregate, CNAP was funded for 
approximately 19,000 more hours than CNAL, but received less funding.  Had CNAP's 
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hours been funded at CNAL CPH for each TMS, CNAP would have received $42 million 
more in OP-20 funding for FY 00. While there might have been rationale for different 
costs between coasts flying the same aircraft, it is doubtful that it would have explained a 
$42 million differential [Ref. 25]. 
The explanation for the disparity between CNAP and CNAL funding lies in 
CNAL's under-execution of PMR two years prior, which artificially raised their CPH 
pricing for the FY 00 POM. Subsequently, CNAP and CNAL discussed methods for 
equitably distributing the funding shortfall between the two TYCOMs. However, this 
"pain sharing" plan did not sell well with CNO staff members, as many felt CNAP's 
problem was the result of past CINCPACFLT decisions to tax the FHP for IT-21 
procurement [Ref. 27]. Additionally, there were significant shortfalls in other 
CINCLANTFLT claimant accounts that needed the dollars. Therefore, no CNAL to 
CNAP resource transfer ever happened. 
For the first four months of FY 00, CNAP executed 82.9 percent PMR. In 
February 2000, CNAP FHP managers briefed CINCPACFLT on its financial position and 
considered three options. 
• OPTION 1: Continue to execute the program at the current rate, 
exhausting all funds on the 10th of September. By expending all stocked 
repairable parts, they could potentially continue operations for an 
additional week. 
OPTION 2: Reduce operations to achieve a manageable dollar shortfall. 
This option represented a cut of 25,000 flight hours across the force. The 
reduction would result in a TACAIR PMR of 74 percent. To accomplish 
this reduction, CNAP managers would reduce PMR for non-deployed 
squadrons to 35 percent. 
OPTION 3: Fly to the current funding to achieve 72 percent PMR. This 
option represented a cut of 32,000 flight hours, further reducing IDTC 
squadrons beyond option 2, increasing the bathtub effect. 
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By selecting option 1, CNAP managers continued to fly the requirements of the 
program during the second quarter. In April FY 00, CNAP managers believed that 
chances for mid-year supplemental funding were declining. Still estimating a $125 
million shortfall and assuming no further funds would be made available, CNAP 
managers shifted the execution strategy to Option 2. They further detailed their plan as 
follows: 
• -Continue to fly deployed forces, but hold a rigid cap at 115 percent of 
PMR 
• -Shutdown CVW-2, 9 and 11 for approximately one quarter each. Place 
aircraft in preservation status with only minimal maintenance, restricting 
purchases of spare parts and AVDLRs 
• -Reduce VP and HSL operations from 83 percent to 67 percent PMR 
• -Cut FRS production by 35 percent in the 4th quarter and, as a result, 
extend some aircrew on sea duty 
• -Execute numerous other small cuts throughout the force, attempting to 
save wherever possible on the margins 
Marine Corps (FMFPAC) flight hour planners intended to continue to operate as 
planned and then execute a total shutdown of both CONUS and deployed aviation forces, 
if no funds were forthcoming by mid August. 
This entire plan was based on no bow waving of AVDLR repairables into FY 01. 
This decision was made because of the adverse effects of bow waving $55.5 million of 
AVDLRs into FY 00. It took until December of FY 00 to recover and get the parts flow 
back up to speed to fully support operations in all aviation communities. The assessment 
was that the budget shortfall was simply too large to solve with bow waving. 
Additionally, the operational schedule for the first quarter of FY 01 had four carriers and 
Air Wings employed.  Bow waving a significant amount into the next fiscal year would 
not have enabled proper part support for those operations.  The above contingency plan 
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was to be executed in May FY 00. Waiting any longer and continuing to fly at the 83 
percent execution rate, without any additional funds, would have jeopardized deployed 
operations [Ref. 27]. 
In early June, a "promised" augment figure of $55 million emerged (in addition to 
$65 million in contingency funds), with the breakdown as follows: 
Reprogramrned from NAVAIR $15 million 
Omnibus reprogramming ,      $35 million 
CNO Reserve $ 5 million 
Later in June, an additional $23 million in CNO reserve was secured. FMB sent 
this money, in addition to the S5 million in CNO money, to CINCPACFLT in late June. 
This brought the total new dollars to $78 million. However, $15 million of the promised 
$35 million Omnibus Reprogramming was rescinded. By reducing expenditures with 
corresponding PMR reductions for IDTC squadrons during the last quarter, CNAP 
managers were able to avoid Ami -deficiency violations and achieve an aggregate 76.6 
percent PMR [Ref. 15], 
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I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
FY98 FY99 FY00 
Initial Controls from CINCPACFLT $ 1,380 $ 1,290 $ 1,289 
CINCPACFLT Withholds (Y2K, IT-21, others) 
CNAP reprogramming to Underfunded Programs 



























Total Funds Spent on FHP $ 1,388 $ 1,343 $ 1,393 
Previous year's bow wave 
FHP Funds Spent on Critical Unfundeds 

















Table 4.6.       Summary of Final Key Amounts for F Y 98, 99 and 00 (Millions of 
Dollars). 
Table 4.6 summarizes key final amounts for the fiscal years that have been 
researched. This table is not intended to serve as a balance sheet, but reflects some of the 
important amounts identified in this chapter. Numbers are approximate and reflect 
information provided to the author from multiple sources. 
This chapter has explained the trends in budget execution of the Flying Hour 
Program (FHP) at Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (CNAP) and detailed specific 
fiscal decisions and cash management techniques used to overcome budget under-funding 
during fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000. The final chapter will summarize the data 
presented and provide answers to thesis research questions. 
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V.      CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore cash management challenges during 
budget execution of the Flying Hour Program (FHP) at Commander Naval Air Forces 
Pacific (CNAP) for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000. This chapter summarizes the 
answers to the primary and secondary research questions and presents final conclusions. 
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
1.        What Methods and Procedures Have Been Used to Execute CNAP's 
Annual FHP Budget to Overcome Under-Funding? 
Recognizing that there are insufficient funds to properly execute the annual FHP 
budget, CNAP managers initially request a higher percentage of annual funding for the 
first quarter in CINCPACFLT's phasing of funding.  As expenditures outstrip resources 
in different fund codes, reprogramming money and requesting that CINCPACFLT 
advance funds from future quarters enables fiscally balancing each account.    CNAP 
managers reduce operating tempo for units in the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle 
(IDTC) and reduce expenses on the margins by leading initiatives to cut maintenance and 
supply costs. 
CNAP managers use cost deferment methods in order to make it through the year 
avoiding Anti-deficiency violations. These procedures include bow waving AVDLRs to 
future fiscal years and using Unfilled Customer Orders (UCOs). Throughout the process, 
CNAP managers monitor expenditure rates and continually communicate shortfalls. By 
articulating their fiscal position up the chain of command, the hope is that funding relief 
that will be provided toward the end of the year. 
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C.        SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.        In   What   Ways   Have   Fiscal   Decisions   and   Budget   Execution 
Techniques Used by CNAP Managers Affected Operational Units? 
Budget  execution  techniques  have  negatively  impacted  non-deployed  unit 
readiness, demonstrated by a significant post-deployment readiness decline (bathtub 
effect) from which a unit must "climb out" prior to the next deployment. This creates a 
short-term impact on unit capability to effectively perform assigned missions.   Overall 
reduction of flight hours creates a long-term impact on individual aviator experience and 
proficiency levels.   Flight hours represent an investment in future combat proficiency. 
By reducing flying hours, Naval Aviation may ultimately be subjected to weaker aviation 
unit proficiency due to a reduced range of experience. 
As CNAP managers have shut down repairables (AVDLR) supply at the end of 
each fiscal year as a result of the bow wave, operational units have suffered, trying to 
restore parts flow to adequately maintain aircraft. Cost reduction techniques such as 
depleting spare part lockers and deployment pack-up kits also create difficulties for 
squadron maintenance personnel to keep aircraft operational. The associated reductions 
of aircraft Fully Mission Capable (FMC) and Mission Capable (MC) rates have not been 
explored in this thesis, e.g., the impact of cannibalization. All of these factors also 
undoubtedly negatively affect unit morale and retention levels. 
2.        How Do Contingencies Affect Budget Execution? 
Contingency operations cause timing issues associated with the expenditure and 
receipt of cash. CNAP managers often pay the cost of the contingencies early in the 
fiscal year and receive money to support contingencies late in the fiscal year.   This 
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exacerbates an already difficult cash flow problem and forces CNAP managers to further 
use creative financing to make it through the year. 
3. What Effect on FHP Execution Has Reprogramming Had? 
Reprogramming has given CNAP managers flexibility to meet unforeseen 
program changes that have occurred during budget execution. To the extent that 
reprogramming has been used to alleviate shortfalls between FHP fund codes, this tool 
has been helpful. 
However, reprogramming has been detrimental to the FHP from a cash 
management perspective when used to augment other under-funded programs. FHP 
dollars have been reprogrammed to pay for aircraft life cycle maintenance (emergent 
unfundeds), contractors to augment undermanned units, training range support and TAD 
costs (Flying Other), and other requirements. CINCPACFLT's practice of withholding 
funds from the FHP for various force computer enhancements is essentially a 
reprogramming at a higher level. All of these expenditures appear to be for valid 
purposes, but were not part of the programming process when FHP budgets were created. 
Thus, reprogramming further depletes an already under-funded FHP. 
Additionally, reprogramming FHP funds may cause future under-funding as 
budget analysts may perceive reprogrammed money as excess funds not required for the 
FHP. 
4. What Implication for the Department of the Navy Does CNAP FHP 
Budgeting Methodology Present? 
Navy budget process revisions are essential to stabilizing the FHP and its related 
programs. Each of the years analyzed in this thesis was characterized by an under-priced 
OP-20. The proper process for identifying the actual cost of the FHP needs to be defined. 
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Once actual costs are determined, the OP-20 or an alternative funding mechanism should 
be priced correctly. 
Planners, programmers and budgeters need to acknowledge and fund the 
requirements that currently force diversion of FHP dollars by correcting the under-funded 
support programs. A more accurate forecast of actual flying hour expenses can then be 
achieved and out-year budgets will not be under-funded. 
The current budget process forces stovepipe development of priorities and 
decisions. If the process is not changed and all costs of Naval Aviation are not properly 
resourced, the FHP will continue to be headed for a "train wreck" every year. The 
systemic problems causing the shortfalls, if left unchecked, will result in out-year flying 
hour budgets unexecutable at any acceptable level. 
D.       CONCLUSIONS 
Each year the POM process produces the OP-20 budgeting document that 
attempts to match resources to requirements and is used as the initial starting point to 
determine the FHP budget. In budget execution many things happen to the dollars that 
were originally in the OP-20 budget. When the dollars available to execute the FHP 
reach the managers at CNAP, the money that was originally in the budget is being used 
for other programs. Thus, the frustrations felt by CNAP FHP managers cannot be 
pinpointed to any one entity. 
The overall budgeting system does not recognize valid bills from many different 
programs and fund them; therefore the FHP (CNAP's only real source of discretionary 
money) is raided every year. The process forces CNAP managers to creatively finance 
throughout the year, and hope for relief at the end of the year.  The resultant dollars to 
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execute the FHP constitute overly restrictive control on CNAP managers and adds no 
value to the process of budget execution. Instead, it adds transaction costs to CNAP 
managers in the form of continually trying to communicate shortfalls, second guessing 
true Fleet execution, and inventing methods of creative financing, including taking risks 
of violating the Anti-deficiency Act. The challenges of budget execution documented in 
this thesis are difficult enough without the additional restrictions of excessive control 
placed upon CNAP's FHP managers. 
The challenge of proper FHP financing through the OP-20 was highlighted by the 
FY 00 imbalance between CNAL and CNAP funding. There are certainly some 
differences between operating environments, but a more consolidated approach to 
funding between the fleets is appropriate. Although not addressed in this thesis, the 
recent efforts by the two Air Type Commanders (TYCOMs) in coordinating efforts 
through the Lead/Follow concept appears to be on target. To have both fleet Air Forces 
execute at the same level is a far more organized approach than having a large difference 
between the TYCOMs. 
FHP budget development and execution trends continue in FY 01. CNAP 
managers estimate a $235 million shortfall and hope to receive a Defense Supplemental 
Appropriation late in the summer FY 01 [Ref. 28]. As in the three years covered in this 
thesis, large funding shortfalls frustrate FHP manager's efforts in developing a coherent 
plan to execute the program. 
Instead of providing budget relief at the end of the year, proper initial funding of 
all programs within Naval Aviation, or use of some alternative method of funding flying 
hours would alleviate the uncertainties and system stress throughout the year and 
71 
especially in third and fourth quarter execution. With such substantial reform, CNAP 
managers will be able to focus on properly supporting fleet requirements, eliminating the 
need of creative and risky financing. Until restrictive controls are removed, CNAP 
managers will not meet readiness requirements, they will have to consider shutting down 
non-deployed squadrons for extended periods of time, and they will risk Anti-deficiency 
Act violations. All the while, CNAP managers will continue in their charter to support a 
combat ready Naval Air Force that is fully prepared to go to sea. 
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